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CURRENCY AND CREDIT ARE EQUIVALENT MECHANISMS
B. Taub*
Abstract . I study a pure exchange economy with many agents whose marginal utility of con-
sumption is stochastically heterogeneous and independent of wealth, with realized marginal
utility of wealth private information. I show that currency and credit are equivalent of a con-
tract that is efficient when the privacy of information is viewed as a constraint, and that the
cash in advance constraint is an expression of an incentive constraint.
1. INTRODUCTION
In his 1980 paper Robert E. Lucas, Jr. concludes that money is a "second rate asset"
using roughly the following intuition. In a purely monetary economy, some individuals
will be liquidity-constrained—that is, they won't have enough money on hand to make
purchases even though their marginal utility of consumption is high. It would make sense
to form coalitions to overcome the presumably unnecessary restrictions imposed by money
so the liquidity-constrained individuals could consume. The prevailing tradition seems to
be that credit markets provide such a superior arrangement:
In any period, there will be some households in a run of low 0's, with large real
balances accumulated but no particular urgency to spend them. There will be
others in a run of high #'s, with balances of y and a high marginal utility of
current consumption. Here. then, are two sides to a nonexistent credit market
on which some would gladly lend at positive interest. . . . Can this gap be tilled
by a government-engineered deflation ? . . . Clearly not. . . . There is a sense in
which money is a second rate asset. [Lucas 1980. p. 219]
A similar view was earlier expressed by Frank Hahn:
The necessary conditions for Pareto-emcieney in a world of uncertainty with in-
tertemporal choice will in general be fulfilled by a market economy only if money
plays no role. There are therefore no grounds for supposing that the Friedman
rule is either necessary or sufficient for Pareto-efficiency since it is of the essence
of an explanation for the existence of money that other conventional necessary
conditions are violated. [Halm, 1971, p. 70]
Green (1987) showed that when information about states is private, credit markets are in
fact imperfect in that they do not fully solve the problem outlined by Lucas and Hahn:
indeed, the use of credit markets for consumption-smoothing can be taken as a symptom of
the existence of informational asymmetries. The point I wish to make here, at least within
the technical confines of the model I use, is that credit markets are no better than currency
markets at overcoming liquidity frictions when there is private information. Money is in
fact not a second rate asset.
Department of Economics. University of Illinois. This paper was presented at Bellcore and ;it the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. I thank workshop participants there and Robert E. Lucas. Jr..
Andrew Atkeson, Mark Huggett, Wayne Shafer, Ed Green. Neil Wallace, and many other colleagues for
comments. I accept responsibility for inconsistently taking their advice.
I demonstrate this equivalence by combining Green's contract-building approach with
the additional element of aggregate feasibility. I find that a contract that attains the
efficiency Lucas and Halm impute is equivalent to both credit and currency eqmlibria.
Not only are currency and credit equivalent, then, but both can attain the efficiency
frontier when all the constraints facing an economy are accounted for: those constraints
must express the fact that information is private. The contract approach highlights the
fact that currency and credit equilibria are insurance mechanisms, and that restrictions on
asset holdings—like credit constraints and cash in advance constraints—exist as means of
eliciting information necessary for the provision of the insurance.
This finding could not have arisen from a representative agent model. In representative
agent models of assets, one is forced to impose motives for holding credit and currency
since assets are unnecessary. In currency equilibria, one is forced to motivate the demand
for currency with cash-in-advanee constraints or by putting money in the utility function.
In credit equilibria, it is necessary to impose borrowing restrictions, typically by imposing
transversality conditions on debt holding as a constraint, not as an endogenous boundary
condition. In heterogeneous-agent models with complete information, money and credit
are unnecessary, because complete insurance is feasible, and complete insurance eliminates
all need for asset exchanges. In a completely insured heterogeneous-agent model, as in a
representative agent model, no assets are ever actually exchanged, even though their prices
can be calculated. But combining privacy of information with heterogeneity provides both
a reason for the existence of money and credit—insurance—and endogenously motivates
the institutional form the insurance takes—cash in advance constraints and borrowing
constraints.
Because currency and credit are insurance mechanisms, the intuition that has arisen
from studying insurance with private information can be applied. The insurance within my
particular model is incomplete, except in special cases I characterize. The efficiency frontier
attainable by currency and credit equilibria therefore also reflects incomplete insurance. As
with static insurance with private information, it is also the case that an equilibrium might
not even exist; there may be adverse selection. It is not just the privacy of information
that causes this adverse selection, but the joint effect of private information and resource
feasibility.
I obtain these findings using a modified version of Lucas's (1980) model in which
the desire for insurance arises from taste shocks rather than income shocks as in Green's
approach. The taste shocks are stochastic and are the marginal utility of consumption
in each period. I think of this as corresponding to actual hunger or need for services
like medical care that arise randomly. Although in the simple setting here the framework
is not very realistic looking, it has the advantage of relative technical transparency, so
that the intuition of the findings is accessible, and it can potentially be expanded to be
more realistic. Moreover, it forms a new class of dynamic programming problems in which
the value function has a closed form solution. Although the boundedness assumption
common in abstract infinite horizon models is not met here. I show that the dynamic
programming approach of such models carries over. Feasibility and incentive compatibility
can be imposed in a way that even has a geometric intuition, because wealth effects are
intrinsically decoupled from substitution effects.
In order to show that money and credit act like an optimal contract. I must first
produce an optimal contract. I do not solve the problem of a planner maximizing the
welfare of a collection of agents; instead I solve the problem of a principal maximizing
profit subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility. The principal's strategy will be
to maximize discounted profit, and that profit may be positive or negative depending on
the discount factor available to him. This is the same strategy used by Green, except Green
assumed equality between the discount factor of individuals and that of the principal.
A second condition can then be imposed: zero profit. Rather than impose zero profit
as a constraint, I ask what parameter values ensure zero profit. Having zero profit is
equivalent to having a mechanism that uses exactly the resources available to the economy,
a prerequisite of efficient mechairisms.
The zero profit condition is equivalent to having competitive firms provide insurance
in the manner of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). However, there are many equilibria
that are both incentive compatible and have zero profit. The optimal equilibrium is that
whose parameter values maximize the welfare ex ante expected discounted utility of
the representative agent. Whether this optimal equilibrium is the optimal mechanism as
well must be shown by a uniqueness argument. I show this by asking what happens if the
optimal equilibrium is transcended by decreasing a parameter—the discount factor of the
principal—below its threshold, finding that a feasible equilibrium cannot exist there. By
also showing that any mechanism that is feasible and incentive compatible cannot surpass
the welfare of the corresponding zero-profit equilibrium. I have shown optimality.
The behavior of consumption at this optimum is different from that in suboptimal
equilibria: it is nonstationary. a property that emerges in other models as well: Green
(1987). Atkesonand Lucas (1990). Thomas and Worrall (1990). and Taub (1990) (although
stationary optimal equilibria can exist if the stochastic process is discrete). Why then be
concerned with stationary, suboptimal equilibria? If one more constraint is imposed, the
class of equilibria shrinks further, and the equilibria in this class are stationary.
The additional constraint is that no individual is ever tempted to defect from the
equilibrium and permanently revert to autarky. By its nature an insurance contract that
is ex-ante desirable to all participants will be ex post undesirable to some. Even if there
is no adverse selection, dynamic contracts are subject to attack from the participants. If
participants are free to defect from a contract, under what conditions will the contract
nevertheless be immune from such defection? This question is of central importance in
dynamic insurance contracts because the redistributive nature of the contract depends on
all participants contributing their contractual shares.
I consider permanent reversion to autarky because it would be the result of a grim
trigger strategy in a principal versus agent game, and as such defines the maximal set of
equilibria that are immune to punishment strategies. The surviving equilibria obey a folk
theorem, but one in which the discount factor of the agents must decrease, rather than
rise, to maintain cooperation. The result is that equilibria that obey the three properties
of incentive compatibility, feasibility, and immunity from defection are a strict subset of
those that obey only the first two properties, and these equilibria are stationary.
This last fact in my view justifies studying asset equilibria that are inefficient. The
borrowing constraints must somehow be sustained without the equivalent of a principal,
and with noncooperative play by the agents. Defection translates into reneging in an asset
equilibrium; the folk theorem states that equilibria exist that prevent such reneging. I
think of this as a kind of dynamic consistency. The folk theorem implies that this dynamic-
consistency is possible only with inefficiently high inflation rates and inefficiently low real
interest rates. But this is realistic.
In the following section I set out an intuitive framework to motivate the stochastic
linear utility framework and also to motivate how restrictions on asset holdings are the
expression of a revelation mechanism. In subsequent sections I show how a contract would
work in this setting. The next section explores the bounds on efficiency. Then I show
that the contract is equivalent to the credit and currency equilibria, and that the efficiency
bounds apply there as well. In the penultimate sections I present folk theorems that
interpret the results in terms of adverse selection and a defection concept. There are seven
short appendices. The first two work out facts about the principal's problem. The next
shows that the solution of the principal's dynamic programming recursion, which is arfine
in the state and hence easy to characterize, is also the value function. The next repeats
the process for the agents in a credit equilibrium. The next to last appendix shows that
nothing has been lost by examining only stationary equilibria in this setting. The final
one shows that the efficiency frontier has a nonstationary solution, but that this solution
is not pathological in other senses.
2. A BABYSITTING COOPERATIVE
While the equivalence between insurance contracts and currency and credit equilibria
emerges from technical considerations. I find it helpful to think about the operation of
a babysitting cooperative for intuitive purposes. 21 A number of parents with young
children who live in a new neighborhood with no teenagers, and far from grandparents.
They obtain babysitting by babysitting for each other's children. Their babysitting needs
are not always simultaneous, and have a random element due to a need for doctor visits,
unplanned shopping trips, car repairs, social invitations, and so on. The random element
makes the problem facing the group one of providing insurance. An insurance contract
to provide a scheme for allocating babysitting time would need to weigh the importance
of a family needing a sitter for a medical visit versus another family's desire for a ca-
sual restaurant meal or tennis lessons. A contract that provided babysitting to families
whenever a family desired it would quickly degenerate—all families would ask for unlim-
ited babysitting. With those same families providing babysitting, the scheme would be
infeasible.
A better scheme would make families reveal the urgency of their need so as to allow
triage—doctor visits would take precedence over tennis lessons. In an anonymous atmo-
sphere with purely private information about need, there would be an incentive for families
I speak from experience.
to claim urgent need for babysitting even if this were not the case. The contract design
problem imposes incentive constraints that force families to reveal their true need.
The contract can do this by tracking each family's history of babysitting requests and
services, imposing limits based on the history. Families with histories of excessive demand
for babysitting would be temporarily denied babysitting. The fear that this denial would
come at a time of great need would prompt families to refrain from demanding babysitting
for frivolous reasons—in other words, triage would be possible. Moreover, if babysitting
were rewarded with a relaxation of the denial, there would be an incentive to babysit for
other families.
Credit might accomplish the same thing, according to Lucas and Halm. Families
needing babysitting would spend credit balances on other members of the cooperative in
return for babysitting, and interest would be paid on unused credit. Some restriction would
have to prevent a family's borrowing without limit, however, and this restriction would
serve as an incentive to conserve on the use of the cooperative's services for fear of having
the restriction bind at a moment of urgent need.
Another way to implement the contract would be to issue tickets to co-op members,
each ticket worth a fixed amount of babysitting time. The tickets would be earned from
other members of the co-op by babysitting for them and expended on the members to
obtain babysitting. The essential feature of the ticket system is that a family can run out
of tickets. A family bereft of tickets could not then obtain sitting services even if their
need was great. The fear of running out would induce families to conserve tickets for
nonfrivolous uses and each family would produce its share of babysitting. 2 - 2
The ticket system has the basic features of a currency. The requirement that babysit-
ting be purchased with tickets is an implementation of a cash-in-advance constraint. The
cash in advance constraints can be viewed as the expression of an incentive constraint, and
I show that this is in fact the case in section 10.
In order to show that ticket and credit systems reflect the operation of efficient con-
tracts, I must develop a more abstract notion of contract. A contract must induce families
to reveal their states, and it must be feasible, and not waste resources. One way to go
at this is to think of each family having access to a private intermediary—a grandparent
perhaps—who provides babysitting in return for later repayment in time from the parents
through a prearranged contract. If that grandparent makes zero profit, it is a simple ex-
tension to note that the cooperative could use the grandparent's contract rules for its own
yielding a feasible and incentive compatible contract. For this reason most of the analytical
effort that follows will be devoted to analyzing the one-family grandparents' contract.
I next outline the quantitative features of the families in the cooperative.
3. STOCHASTIC LINEAR UTILITY AND THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
In this section I describe the central element of the technical models that follow: families
2 2
In my own experience it was a bit more complicated: tickets were borrowed and loaned, and occa-
sionally purchased with cash.
with stochastic utility. Each family has a fixed, identical endowment y of babysitting time
in each period. A family consumes only babysitting, and discounts the discrete stream of
lifetime consumption, with each period's consumption weighted with a stochastic marginal
utility: utility at time t is
EtX>a0t-MCt+a . (3.1)
3=
where 3 is the discount factor. c t is consumption of babysitting at time t. and 9 t is a
stochastic taste parameter. The linearity of consumption means that a nonnegativity
constraint for consumption must be explicit:
ct+a > 0. s > 0. (3.2)
The taste shock. 9. is identically and independently distributed in each period as follows:
~ F(-). O<0<0<0< 3c.
The realizations are assumed independent across time for each family. When a family has a
low realization of 0, it will wish to store its time endowment in anticipation of realizations
of high marginal utility. This desire to substitute consumption through time is the central
force in the model. Because babysitting time is nonstorable. exchange of some sort is the
only hope for such intertemporal substitution.
The realizations of 9 are assumed independent across families as well as across time
for each family, and the law of large numbers is assumed to hold. 31 This is the source
of the potential for exchange in the cooperative: parents who are "desperate" 1 (ie. have
a high 9 realization, as when one child needs to go the the doctor and another must be
left at home) will wish to maximize their consumption, while those who are not desperate
should, in a well-behaved equilibrium, be willing to transfer consumption to the desperate
in anticipation of a quid pro quo for their own future need.
My analysis will rise or fall on the existence of the value function, as I use a dy-
nannc programming approach. In my narrow technical framework, utility functions are
unbounded, and therefore the arguments that have been set out in more familiar dynamic
programming models don't directly apply here. Nevertheless, the existence of the value
function can be demonstrated, and indeed the solutions form a new class of closed form
solutions that are of independent technical interest.
The existence issue arises because the optimization problem of grandparents and in-
dividuals is an extension of the following very simple one.
oc
maxV ps 9
c
t+s (3.3)
ct,kt ^~—'
s=Q
That is. there is no aggregate uncertainty because the cross-sectional distribution of families'
realizations replicates F() in every period. Judd (1985) shows that, it is valid to assume this.
subject to
ct + kt+i < okt + yt (3.4)
where 3 is a fractional discount factor, 8 is a constant. ct +s is consumption. k t is current
capital (or the stock of some asset like money or bonds), i/t is some endowment and is
the gross marginal product of capital. There are nonnegativity constraints:
ct >0, (3.5)
kt+i > 0. (3.0)
Finally, the initial stock of capital, k t , is given.
This looks like a standard capital theory problem except for the linearity of utility
and the production function. It has a trivial solution for the policy: if < 0~ , consume
all capital immediately and obtain zero income and utility thereafter: if (f> > Q~ l . then
always save. And if 6 = 3~ ] . optimal behavior is indeterminate. The value is clearly
defined in the first case: it is Okt + Y^isLo P
3
^Vt + s- When <j — j3 : the value is infinite. When
<p > ,3~
l
. no consumption ever occurs since it is always productive to save. The value of
discounted utility is infinity in that case, since the stock of capital grows faster than it is
discounted. Yet there is a paradox in that the individual with such a value would never
actually consume any output and would hence have a value of zero. It is better to simply
say that the value is undefined.
Things are not so cut and dried if 8 can change over time. If the parameter <b is below
3~ l
. and 8 takes on a low value 8 for T periods and a high value 8 thereafter, the optimal
policy would be to save for T periods and then consume thereafter. The value function
and policy would exist and be well defined in every period. Extending this logic, 8 could
fluctuate between 8 for T periods and 8 for U periods indefinitely. The existence of the
value function and the optimal policy would then be more delicate. There must be some
argument that T, U and o interact so that the sum in (3.3) converges: this requires a
restriction on the growth rate of consumption, and this is equivalent to requiring a bound
on (p that is more complicated than 3~ l .
In the sequel, 8 fluctuates in this way, but stochastically, and moreover the analogue
of (j> is endogenous. I show that equilibria exist when conditions lead to satisfying the
stochastic analogue of the growth condition for 0. Those conditions arise in monetary
equilibria in which inflation is higher than is physically efficient. They arise in credit
equilibria in which borrowing constraints are tighter than is physically efficient. And they
arise in an optimal mechanism that redistributes endowment in a way that is physically
inefficient. When these conditions cannot arise, I call that the nonexistence of equilibrium.
An important difference between this and standard bounded-utility dynamic program-
ming is that undefined values and nonexistence of equilibrium are possible, and therefore
some work has to be done to find the boundaries of these unpleasant possibilities. When
the work is done, these boundaries have economic meaning.
4. A PRIVATE INSURANCE CONTRACT 1
If each family in the cooperative had a set of grandparents nearby, they could satisfy
their babysitting needs through a long term contract with the grandparents. I will now
develop the mechanics of a contract provided by grandparents to a single family in the
above setting. I will later show that the set of such contracts includes as a subcase the
efficient cooperative contract. I then use this as a benchmark against which to assess
cooperative babysitting arrangements such as credit and ticket equilibria.
The grandparents are risk neutral and are in that sense like a "classical" principal:
nor do they undergo taste shocks like the family. I speak of the grandparents as a a
principal rather than an intermediary in order to emphasize that the contract is between the
grandparents and a single family, without regard for the aggregate time resource constraint
of the cooperative. Risk neutrality yields unchanging marginal valuations under statistical
expectation: statistical expectation corresponds to averaging demands across families in
determining prices.
The grandparents have access to infinite resources at a fixed discount factor, en. but
this discount factor is not necessarily the same as 3. that of the family. The grandparents
can therefore sell insurance to the family by storing babysitting time when the family's
realized need is low, and releasing it when it is high. I use the term "insurance" because
of the family's desire to offset uncertainty, but the desired outcome of the insurance is not
pure smoothing as in the case of concave utility but the opposite: binging when need is
high.
The grandparents' discounted return is:
Et^a3{y-ct+a ),
s=0
that is. the return is the excess of the family's income over consumption kept by the
grandparents, discounted at a. Imitating the recursive structure used by Green (19*7.
section 8) and by Thomas and Worrall, the dynamic programming recursion of this value
is
W(V) = sup / [y - 7(0, V) + aW(V'{0, V))}dF(V). (4.1)
7 (.),v(-)Jo
subject to the constraints
V= { f^ (a.V) + 3V'(cr.V)}dF(e) (4.2)
Je
Q~/(8.V) + [3V , (6,V) >0-y{0*,V) + pV'{8*,V), 0*^0 (4.3)
li<?.V)>0 (4.4)
V'(a.V) >V (4.5)
V given. (4.6)
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The grandparents indirectly solve the family's problem because the value function recursion
of the family is a constraint, indeed it is the law of motion of the grandparents. The
grandparents attempt to capture the family's time endowment by offering a combination
of current consumption. 7(^7, V). and a future value. V'(a. V). that yields some fixed value
of expected utility. V. As the game evolves, this initial value of V is replaced by values
V that have been set in advance by the grandparents' contract, reflected in the recursion
constraint (4.2). The grandparents would like to minimize the value they give the family,
but are restrained from doing so by the recursion constraint and the initial value. u
These combinations of consumption and expected value respond to a signal, <7, the family
sends about its realized state of need.
Extracting information about the family's state, which the grandparents cannot ob-
serve independently, is the only nontrivial task faced by the grandparents. Without some
restriction, the family would always report desperate need if it generated a positive pay-
off. The information extraction task is accomplished by imposing incentive compatibility
constraints. (4.3). requiring that the value of reporting falsely is less than the value of
reporting truthfully.
If there were no uncertainty and a > $. the grandparents would lend to the family:
because of the linearity of the returns, the grandparents would initially lend an infinite
amount to the family, collecting the high-interest return in the infinite future. With
uncertainty, this degeneracy does not appear because of the necessity of the grandparents'
extracting information from the family. Thus the excess of the grandparents' discount
factor over that of the family can be thought of as an information extraction premium,
corresponding in some sense to a risk premium.
The timing of actions implicit in the statement of the problem is as follows. First, the
grandparents set the consumption and value functions, and the choices are known to the
family. Then, the taste shock. #, is realized. The family sends a signal, a, which states
the value of the shock truthfully: a = 0. The grandparents collect consumption from the
family if a low 8 is reported, and give consumption to the family if 9 is high. The process
then begins anew, with V replaced by V'(9, V).
The next constraint, (4.4), is simply the non-negativity of consumption constraint
that reflects the unavailability of storage for the family. The constraint (4.5). restricts
the grandparents from offering extremely low future values in exchange for high current
consumption. Hitting V_ corresponds to a family (a desperate one) spending all its money
or borrowing to the hilt. V is not necessarily an absorbing state; a family that is not
desperate can have its value state increased by the grandparents as a reward for refraining
from consuming babysitting. While no motivation of the level of V is offered at this
stage, I show in section 8 that when an additional restriction corresponding to aggregate
feasibility is imposed, the value of V_ is determined as an endogenous function of the
stochastic structure. and taste parameters.
The idea of using another agent's utility as a state variable in a recursion dates to Lucas and Stokey
(1984); see also Stokey and Lucas (1989), pp 117 and 195. An additional reference is Abreu, Pierce and
Stacchetti (198(5). Green and Thomas and Worrall also made extensive use of the idea.
5. THE SOLUTION OF THE THRESHOLD VALUE OF 9
The grandparents' policy functions have a monotonicity property which greatly simplifies
the sets over which family value states stochastically evolve. There are two sets of values of
9: low and high. Within each set there is a fixed strategy, and across the sets the incentive
constraints hold in a particular way. The sets necessarily have a monotonic relationship
with each other. The boundary dividing these sets, 9* . along with the fixed policies that
apply within the two sets, completely characterize the policy functions. The analysis can
focus on finding these three numbers.
I show this property in Appendix A. Thus there is a cutoff value of 9, 9*. such that
below that point a single policy is followed by the grandparents and vice versa:
7(*) = \7, e*<9<e U1)
y> {e)= SV- 9_<9<9*_ }\v, o* <e <e v '
with 7 > 0, and V > V_ . The intuitive reason the solutions have this form is as follows.
First, it is efficient to provide babysitting in high-# states. Some compensation must be
taken for that provision in order to maintain incentive compatibility, and that compensa-
tion is a reduction of the future value of babysitting for the family. Conversely, the family's
future value is increased if it has a low 9.
Within each of the sets 9 < 9 < 9* and 9* < 9 < 9, the reason that a noncon-
stant reward would fail to be incentive compatible is that the marginal incentive to lie is
proportional to 9, which is nonconstant. The marginal incentive to lie is
OS OS
and it must be zero in an incentive compatible contract. Since 9 ranges over a continuum,
the only way to do this is to make both §-nf(s,V) and -j^V'(s.V) both zero except at
discrete points. What remains is to find those discrete points, and then show that there is
at most one of them. I show all this formally in the appendix.
With the structure of the policies determined, the next step is to find the actual values
of the three policy parameters in terms of the fundamentals of the economy. In order to
do that, it will be necessary to find the value function for the principal. The first step in
this process is to note that the incentive constraints now boil down to two equations, one
for each 9-set:
PV>6i + pV 9<9<9\
07 + 3V > dV 9* <9 <9.
Both constraints will be satisfied if and only if the hunger threshold 9* satisfies the equation
0*J + PV = /3V. (5.3)
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Using this information, the grandparents' maximum problem can now be restated in
these terms:
max {y - (1 - F(0*))i + aF(0*)W(V) + a(l - F(fl*))W'(Z)} (5.4)
subject to
»6
V= I 0*fdF(0) + {3F(0*)V + (3(1 - F(0*))V (5.5)
and the binding incentive constraint
-r-, + 3{V -V) = 0. (5.6)
For notational convenience, I now define r lit 1 quantities <b{ti*) = |,y . HdF{0) and £(#*) =
F(tt*)6* + <&{0*). (The notation (5 is purposely meant to evoke statistical expectation: if
F is Bernoulli, and 0* is between the two realizations, then £ — E(B).) In matrix form the
two constraints then take the form
f)-(*jP mny
l (v-m-^<n)vy
(57)
with solution
F
=( 1 -' )^)) i:+^ K <M >
^ftW^'-'^-
(r, '
,)
The problem of finding the optimal threshold value of 0* can be considered separately
from that of finding the optimal functions 7 and V . This requires first finding the value-
function. The technique will be to make a good initial guess and then verify that it has
appropriate properties. In this endeavor, posit that W is affine in the current value state:
W(V) = Wq + WVV7". In Appendices B and C I show that this function solves the dynamic
programming recursion and that it is the grandparents' value function. In Appendix C I
show that the grandparents' Bellman equation recursion devolves into an Euler equation
in B\
0* = l
-S{0*). (5.10)
a
This equation, and therefore H* . is independent of the current value state, V . ensuring that
the solution is constant over time.
PROPOSITION 5.1. IfF is nonatomic and a > j3, then there is a unique 0* e [0,0].
The proof makes use of the properties of S in a simple fixed point argument. With the
solution in hand. I now turn to characterizing the stochastic processes of consumption and
the family's value state. Using the intuition that W is decreasing in V\ the solutions of
the maximum problem can be stated easily: consumption will be zero if the family signals
11
nondesperation. and will be at a maximum if desperation is signalled. Thus in the case of
desperation, the family's value state will revert to its minimum.
In the case of nondesperation, the family's value state grows according to the difference
equation (5.8). with the rate of growth of the value determined by the coefficient of V.
9* f{3£(9*). Since consumption is an affine function of V according to (5.8), it is necessary
to show that the rate of growth is bounded sufficiently for the value to be well defined, as
discussed in section 3. I turn to this analysis in the next section.
6. THE DISTRIBUTION OF STATES AND THE GRANDPARENTS' VALUE
I will now show when the optimum for the grandparents exists by characterizing the
stochastic process for each family's state and associated babysitting consumption, and
then establish when the sum characterizing discounted expected profit for the grandparents
converges. If the grandparents arc too patient, the grandparents will provide unlimited
babysitting, yet never collect anything in return. The sum characterizing discounted profit
does not converge, and is then undefined in the sense given in the introduction. Even if it
were assumed that the grandparents provided babysitting in this circumstance, it would
not characterize a contract that required no outside resources.
Because the family reverts to V_ with probability (1 — F(9*)). the set of states value
states is discrete and is described by restating (6.5) as a difference equation:
Vk = {l-0p)V + pVk- l , (6.1)
V = V,
where I define the growth coefficient, p, by
p = 9*/(3E{9*). (6.2)
Observe that < p < 0~ l and is a nondecreasing function of 9* .
The need states will have a distribution, $. with probabilities ijjk- Associated with
each state is a consumption level, 7&. From equation (6.6),
!k •X+TTTTrrVfc-i, fc = l,
S{0*)- 8(9*)
The probabilities ipk of state Vk are
iPk = (l-F(9*))F(9*) k , fc = 0,.... (6.3)
That is. a family is desperate and reverts to state zero with probability (1 — F(9*)) regard-
less of its present state, obtaining value V_. Subsequent nondesperation occurs regardless
" Not quite: the family's initial value could start out of the set of discrete values generated by the
solution for the grandparents' policy. However it is straightforward to show that the distribution of states
* converges strongly; I do this in the appendix.
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of state with probability F{&*) with the value state Vk rising to Vfc+i- thus there is a long
run probability F(9*){l-F(8*)) of the family being in state 1, F(0*) 2 (1 - F(0*)) for state
2. and so on.
The solution of the difference equation for Vk is
Vk = (l-pk )V s +pk V. (6.4)
where Vs is the stationary solution.
V ee i-^Z- (6.5)
(1-P)
Substituting from (6.4) into (6.6),
fc-1\T/\l
,
.fc-1(-,jv + ((i-/- , )r^ + //- 1 v))-
* S{6*)
The probability of jk is the probability of state V^_i times the probability of desperation:
Pr(7jb) = 0*-i(l-F(O).
The grandparents' expected utility must be convergent. If the grandparents start
a family with value V\ then the expected payout by the grandparents is the sum of the
probabilities of payout jk, discounted by ak , the discount factor relevant for the realization.
Expected profit is
]T ak wk (y - jk ) = Jjl - F(9*))(<xF(0*))k (y - jk ). (6.6)
fc=i fe=i
The conditions needed for convergence are
aF(0*) < 1. aF(9*)p< 1.
The following proposition shows that these conditions are generically satisfied.
PROPOSITION 6.1. If F is nonatomic, 1 > a > (3 are sufficient conditions for the
fixed point of the dynamic programming problem, W , to be the value of the grandparents'
problem.
PROOF: From the first order condition for 0* . (5.10), the optimal value of 9* is such
that pc\ = 1. and since a < 1. convergence of (6.6) is guaranteed if F(H*) < 1. By
proposition 5.1, H* < ~H and hence F(0*) < 1. The amne solution to the grandparents'
dynamic progrannning recursion is therefore defined. The hypothesis a > Q satisfies the
growth condition in lemma C.4. and by proposition C.5. the solution of the dynamic
programming problem is therefore the value function.
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The intuition of the proof is that the conditions of the proposition provide a bound
on the growth rate of the family's value state, and this growth rate is dominated by the
discounting of the grandparents.
7. THE ZERO-PROFIT FRONTIER
A social insurance contract would begin with families in a common state, maximizing
the expected utility of a representative family, subject to revelation and to feasibility. The
grandparents so far have induced revelation. I now impose feasibility as well, the equivalent
of requiring zero profit in Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) analysis of static insurance
markets. Each value of a. the discount factor of the grandparents, is associated with a
zero-profit equilibrium, and endogenously fixes a minimum value state, V_, a parameter
that has up until now been exogenous.
The reason for focusing attention on zero profit equilibria is that they have the po-
tential to be equivalent to optimal mechanisms. In a partial equilibrium setting this would
be immediate, but a more formal demonstration is needed here.
One could contemplate optimal contracts directly, as Atkeson and Lucas (1990) have
done. There are two reasons for thinking about them indirectly as I am doing here.
First, the indirect approach admits the possibility of inefficient equilibria. As a technical
proposition this set is relatively easy to characterize. One can look at the boundary of
this set: the boundary' will be the set of efficient contracts. Second, the discounting of
the grandparents turns out to have a direct and appealing connection to interest rates in
equilibrium. One can map the search for an equilibrium interest rate into the search for
a discount factor. Since grandparent contracts exist for many discount factors, the search
for the "correct" discount factor that corresponds to an equilibrium can be deferred to a
later stage of analysis.
A feasible program uses no outside resources:
E(i) < y.
Since there is no satiation here, it is relevant to focus on contracts in which there is no
waste of resources so that equality holds. Calculating the expectation, the condition is
= X> - ^n) 2F(on k - l I^-{-f3V + ((1 - pk
~ l)V3 + pk
' l V)}
k=l { '
(1 - F{9*)) 2 f V 3 - pV V- V s
(7.1)
8(6*) [l-F{0*) l-pF(B*\
If the sum converges, the equation can be solved for the minimum value state. V_:
l-pF(fl-) y
Welfare of the family. A Rawlsian welfare notion starts a family in a coopera-
tive with random initial expected utility, with the probability distribution of that initial
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expected utility identical to its long-run stationary probability distribution. Contractual
welfare is the average of this initial state over the stationary distribution, that is.
Y, <l>kVk = 5^(1 - F(6*})F(9*)
k{(l - p
k)Vs + pkV) (7.3)
fc=0 fc=0
To calculate this value, substitute for V_ from the zero-profit condition (7.2). yielding
$(#*) u
E(V) = — (7.4)
if the sum converges. The upper bound of this expected value is 9y/{\ — d). Thus families
receive utility equal to that which they could receive by consuming all their endowment
as if in their most desperate state. This is preferable to autarky, which would yield
an expected value of only E{9)y/{\ - 3). since the conditional mean <£>(#* )/(l — F(9*})
exceeds E(9). However the maximum of this utility depends on 9* , which in turn influences
whether the sum is convergent. In fact, welfare is clearly increasing in 9*. But the Rawlsian
ideal welfare cannot be attained:
PROPOSITION 7.1. If F is nonatomic, 0* < 9 and the family's welfare in the
zero-profit contract is hounded strictly below By/{I — 3).
PROOF: The condition pF{0*) < 1 is necessary for the convergence of (7.1). Com-
bined with the first order condition pa = 1 from (6.10), this puts an upper bound on
F(o*y.
a = Xfp>F(9*). (7.5)
Expected family welfare is maximized when the two conditions a = and F{H*) = 1 both
hold; the last inequality says this is impossible.
The condition needed for convergence, namely pF(0*) < 1. means maximum welfare
is attained when F(9*) = 1/p = a. This results in the equation for the maximum feasible
e*,
{1-P)0*F{9*) =(3${9*). (7.6)
The left hand side of this equation is monotone increasing in 0* . ranging from zero to
(1 — 0)9 . The left hand side is monotone decreasing (because $'(9) — —9F'{9)) ranging
from 0E{9) to zero. Therefore a unique interior solution exists.
The solution and actual welfare will depend on the particular distribution used. Ex-
amples were presented in my 1988 paper.
The growth factor p is the implicit rate of return available to the grandparents for
investing in the value state of the family. This rate of return is an increasing function of
9*
—as the range of states which provide no babysitting grows, the rate of return needed
For a nonatomic measure the upper bound of utility could not be implemented— it involves each
familiy having an infinite waiting time for the most desperate state.
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to compensate families for foregoing sitting increases. The grandparents pay a high rate of
return to most families who are savers. To maintain zero profit, they must extract payments
from families that cash in their babysitting values by setting the minimum value. V_. very
low. Beyond a threshold this value becomes negative. Because of the recursive definition of
the family's value, the minimum value can be negative only if the family endures negative
consumption, which is infeasible.
These negative findings might be mitigated if the grandparents' contract could be
bettered by a cooperative mechanism. The following theorem argues that this cannot be
done.
THEOREM 7.2. No feasible, incentive-compatible cooperative mechanism provides
greater welfare than the maximal zero profit contract.
PROOF: Denote the average welfare level in the zero-profit equilibrium Vo(y). Sup-
pose such a mechanism existed. It would supply an average welfare level. Kw(y)- greater
than Vo(y). The mechanism is independent of the endowment level: in particular it could
be imposed on an economy identical except for having a lower income and consequent lower
welfare. Choose a level of income y' < y such that V\f(y') = V (y). Now let the grand-
parents operate the mechanism, offering the same level of welfare as before. Vo(y), after
extracting y'—y from the family in each period. Then they now make positive profit, which
contradicts the assumption that the grandparents had maximized profit. The grandparents
could attain zero profit by returning y' — y to the family, however this would contradict
the maximality assumption.
The zero profit frontier is therefore the efficiency frontier for the (xx^perative's mech-
anism.
8. CREDIT
In a large babysitting cooperative without grandparents, by the logic of Lucas and Hahn
there is nevertheless potential for exchange. Families that are desperate will wish to
maximize their consumption of babysitting, while those that are not should, in a well-
behaved equilibrium, be willing to lend to the desperate in anticipation of their own future
need. I now construct a credit equilibrium in this setting in preparation for addressing
this point.
The mechanics of the credit equilibrium are as follows. Each family is characterized
by a state of debt, B. That state fluctuates stochastically, falling when babysitting need is
high and rising when it is low. Not surprisingly, families follow a rule that they save when
their babysitting need is below a threshold, and borrow when it is above the threshold.
Because utility is linear, when babysitting needs are high, the family "blows its wad" and
then starts over with the most debt they are permitted. With each family undergoing
different shocks, there is a distribution of debt states that must be zero in the aggregate.
The interest rate is set to ensure that this condition is met.
In a credit equilibrium, families can borrow and lend at a fixed interest rate. Express-
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ing the family's problem in recursive form,
V(B.O) = max{9c + /3EV(B',9')} (8.1)
c,B'
subject to
c + B' < y + rB. (8.2)
c > 0, (8.3)
where r is the gross interest rate, and B' is bonds held into the next period: borrowers
have negative bond holdings.
In addition, there is a borrowing constraint that limits debt to a function of wealth.
It is only necessary to limit borrowing, since saving is limited by available endowment:
1 - r"*
+ 1
B' > 1/. n* > -co, (8.4)
with n* negative. As n* tends toward minus infinity, the borrowing constraint tends toward
discounted wealth in the usual way. The starting point for the constraint is to note that a
family that started with no bonds and that was repeatedly nondesperate would accumulate
debt geometrically:
iBn}n=o = iv- rV + !J- r{ry + y) +y. }.
and
" l-rn+1
Bn = 22 rjy =—~t~^ n - n
*
: (8 ' 5)
where n indexes the number of periods elapsed in a continually nondesperate state, with
n = arbitrarily chosen to index the initial period of low urgency. Similarly, a family that
started out in debt and was repeatedly nondesperate would spend all income on repayment
and repay the debt in increments of size rny, with n negative. The fundamental restriction
expressed in (8.4) with n* > —oo is that the family must be able to repay its debt in a
finite time if it is continually nondesperate. If n* = — oo were permitted, borrowers could
never repay their debt.
Solution of the family's problem . As when solving the problem of the grandparents,
it is extremely helpful to first establish that the solution of the Bellman equation has a
particular convenient form and then establish that it also is the value function. As with
the grandparents' problem, it is easy to see that the solution to the Bellman equation is
affine in bonds. I defer to appendix D the proof that it is the value function.
V(B,0) =A {8) + AB (B)B. (8.6)
Linear progamming methods can now be used to find the optimum. The solution for
consumption is
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where A B = EAB . Thus when an family is desperate, it can consume its endowment plus
interest (or less interest if it is a debtor) and in addition nearly the present value of all
future endowments. The solution for B' is
[rB + y 9 < {3A B
- 1—r- y 0>/3AB
Substituting the solutions into the functional equation defined by (8.6) yields the pair of
equations
' 0AQ + 0AB (rB + y) B< 0AB
M0) + AB(0)B=\ »(u + rB+
1
-^-
y)
9 > 6An
+ JAq — j3AB -
I _
,.'i
-H
r
Equating coefficients of B° and B l and simplifying yields the pair of equations
PAo + 0A BV ^ < 0AB
' By + (3A + y{9 - flAB ) 9 > pAB
a ia\ -. J !iA B r 6 < (3ABAB{6)
-\0r 6>PAB
The marginal value of bonds, AB (0), is defined solely in terms of its own future average.
Averaging and simplifying yields an equation in this average:
AQ = -!L- J pA BF(pAB ) + f OdF(0)1 ~ & \ Ji$A B
1-rn* + l
T
- 1 I //3,1b
/ ^)-/?iB(l-F(/34 fi))
(8.7)
AB = r{/3ABF{0AB)+ f OdF(O)} (S.S)
J(3A B
PROPOSITION 8.1. If fir < 1, there is a unique solution to (8.8).
PROOF: Multiply (8.8) by /?; it then duplicates the grandparents' Euler condition for
0*
. and proposition 5.1 applies.
These solutions can now be used to find the equilibrium interest rate.
I now set out a standard definition of a credit equilibrium. I focus only on stationary
equilibrium here, but in the appendix I argue that nonstationary equilibria don't change
the analysis. There are two kinds of nonstationary equilibria to contemplate. In the
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first, some initial distribution changes over time but eventually converges to the stationary
distribution I characterize here. In the second, some initial distribution changes but does
not converge. Both types are possible here. In Appendix F I show that the convergent
type is generic and converges strongly to the stationary equilibrium. In Appendix G I
show that the nonstationary equilibrium exists at the boundary of the set of all equilibria,
but that its nonstationarity does not affect the implicit rate of return. 8l
A necessary condition for a credit equilibrium is that for every debtor there is a
creditor, or that net economy-wide debt is zero at all times, with all debt following each
family's optimal policies / and g. If the equilibrium distribution function of debt in
stationary equilibrium is #(•). then the equilibrium condition is
B<M(B)=0 (8.9)
The equilibrium distribution describes the distribution of debt, but each family's debt
fluctuates as each family optimizes in response to shocks. A second necessary condition
for the equilibrium is that the distribution of debt must evolve in a way that is consistent
with these fluctuations. In a stationary equilibrium, the distribution must be stationarv.
Imitating the notation of Lucas (1980), the functional equation that characterizes the
stationary equilibrium is
#(B') = / / ilF{0)dV{B)
{(0,B):g(0,B)<B'}
where the function g is the family's policy function that maps babysitting need and debt
states into new debt states defined above. Because of the discrete structure of the support
of ^. it is possible to rewrite this as
#(£') = F{pAB )<H{?-^-) + (1 - F{j3AB )). (8.10)
r
The first term corresponds to families that transit into state B' or lower from nondes-
peration by buying an additional unit of bonds or paying off part of their debt. The
second term corresponds to families that are desperate and borrow up to the borrowing
constraint. The equation is similar to Lucas's (1980) equation (11) and to equation (17)
in Taub (1988) in that families can uspend down" their bond accumulation all at once.
Recalling that bondholdings are indexed by sequences of consecutive nondesperate periods
in (8.5), (8.10) can be written as an ordinary first-order difference equation:
# n = F(0AB)*n-i 4- (1 - F(3A B )). n > n*. (8.11)
with solution
9n = 1 - F{(3AB )n
-n*+\
8 1
Atkeson and Lucas develop machinery that handles this nonstationarity. It is important to handle
it because it emerges gcnerically in efficient equilibria.
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This solution is stable in the sense that if the economy "starts up"' with an arbitrary
distribution of debt satisfying (8.9). it will converge strongly to this equilibrium debt
distribution: a proof of this is given in appendix F.
Thus in the long run there are many debtors close to their borrowing limit and creditors
with widely dispersed wealth levels. With the distribution of debt explicit, it is possible to
explore the relation between the equilibrium interest rate and the borrowing restriction.
The probability of state n is:
wn = * n - *n_, = F(/lIB )"-n'(l - F{(3AB )) (8.12)
which is identical to the probability in (6.3). Substituting in the zero aggregate debt
equilibrium condition (8.9) from (8.12) and (8.5) yields the equilibrium condition
0- Y F{j3AB ) n-n ' (1 - F{0AB )) 1 ~ r", !J (8.13)
*—
'
/ — 1
n—n*
If the sums converge, this reduces to
r
„.+1= l-rF(/gB )
1 - F(f3AB )
When combined with (H.H). this condition determines the equilibrium interest rate for a
given n*.
PROPOSITION 8.2. There is an N > -oo such that for all n* < N, an equilibrium
interest rate r exists such that r < 1/ ft, and r is decreasing in n*
.
The proof is in the appendix E.
The proposition shows that relaxing the borrowing constraint is associated with in-
creasing interest rates. It also shows that the equilibrium interest rate must be below
the inverse of the subjective discount factor. This finding agrees with other work on
heterogeneous-agent asset equilibria: recent examples include Clarida (1990) and Huggett
(1991).
9. CREDIT IS AN INSURANCE CONTRACT
I now demonstrate that solving the grandparents' problem is equivalent to solving the
family's problem in a credit equilibrium, using duality analysis as Green did. This will
enable me to show that a credit equilibrium mimics an optimal cooperative contract.
To do this. I focus separately on the linear programming part of the problem and show
that the dual problem of the grandparents can be manipulated to become the dual of the
family's problem. I then show that the threshold value 9* is the same for the grandparents'
problem and the family's problem when the rate of return is equal to the discount rate of
the grandparents.
For this purpose it is convenient to treat the grandparents' problem as one with just
two Bernoulli distributed ^-shocks, 0\ and Oo- The correspondence with the continuum of
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shocks is as follows: 9\ = 0*, 92 = (1 - F(9*))~ 1 ^{9*), Pr(0O = = F{9*). Also define
v = V — V_ and v; t = V{ — V, i = 1, 2; thus when V is at its minimum, u is zero.
Write the problem of the grandparents in which shocks are Bernoulli distributed as a
cost minimization problem in which all the constants have been gathered to the left hand
side:
min{07i + (1 - 0)72 4- aWv((f>vi + (1 - 0)^2)}
subject to the value recursion constraint
00i7i + (1 - 0)^272 + P(f>v\ + 0(1 - <j>)v2 > v + (1 - 0)V,
and the incentive and nomiegativity constraints
0i 7i -0172 + 0v\ -fe > 0,
0272 - 0271 + 0U2 - /Jci > 0,
H > 0, v, > 0,
where Wo is the constant part of the grandparents' value function. In matrix form this is
min ( (p (1-0) OiOWy (\(l — 6)Wy
v2 I
%i)
subject to
001 (1-0)02 0<f> 0(1-4)
01 -01
-P
02 -02 -0
and the nonnegativity constraints.
Defining x = (xi,x2 ,xs), the dual problem is
/7i\
72
\ v2 J
> (9.2)
max x'
X
v + (l-0)V
subject to
9.1
00i 0i 02 \
1 - 0)02 -0i -02
04> -0
0{l-<t>) -0 )
x <
(1-0)
(\(j)\V\
\a{\-o)\\\
(9.3)
Readers may find the argument easier to follow by temporarily disregarding the incenl ive const raints.
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x > 0. (9.4)
Now define Z\ = x\
,
2-2 = #r ^j and Z3 = a?i £3. Also define w = Wyv, and
IF = Wq + WvY_. Observe that the problem of maximizing x\{v + (1 — 3)V_) is the same
as minimizing z\(y + w + (1 — a)W), since both v + (1 — (3)V_ and y + w + (1 — a)W are
constants. Dividing the last two constraints by Wy and rearranging, the dual problem can
therefore be written
'y + w+ (1 -a)W
mm
2
.T
subject to the reformulated constraint
(1-0) 0,
c*0 -.W7 1
\ t*(i-0) /w*- 1
"02 \
0o
,w
3 >
001 \
3o\\r-\
l5Wy y ) \P(l-<l>)Wy l )
z>0.
(9.6)
(9.7)
Call this the inverted dual problem. This problem is itself the dual of another problem:
that of the familv. The dual of the inverted dual is
max ( <pB\
~1i,Wi
(1-0)0, 0<f>Wy l 0(1- tWy 1 ) (9.8)
subject to
(1-0)
"01 01
-0O 09
a0
-0W7 1
rv(l-0)
/3Wv
pwz-1
/7i\
-,•)
w 1
V 102 /
< (9.9)
and nonnegativity constraints. (The "extra"' constraints appear as a residual of the incen-
tive constraints. They state the requirement that in any "interesting" credit equilibrium,
the borrowing constraint must be binding in at least some states. )
PROPOSITION 9.1. Ti2e value of problem (9.1-2) is y + w + (1 - a)W if and only if
the wlue of problem (9.8-9) is v + (1 - P)V.
PROOF: If the grandparents' problem is solved with a binding recursion constraint,
then by duality the maximum expected value of the family's problem is v + {l — d)V_. If the
family's problem is solved with a binding budget constraint then by duality the minimum
expected cost of the grandparents' problem is y + w + (1 — a)W.
Now define credit as B[ = o{w t + W), and define the borrowing constraint by the
case when the nonnegativity constraint for Wi is binding: Bt > B = —aW. Substituting
22
the definition of the value B t in the maximand. the family' problem becomes the credit
problem
V = max{>0i7i + (1 - d)02yi
+3 (<p(V + Wy l(-W + «- l B[)) + (1 - tb)(V + Wy x{-W + a- l B'2 ))}
subject to
7l + (1 - 0)72 + <f)B[ + (1 - <p)B'2 < y + (*~
] B
B' > B, 7, > 0.
where the extra constant in the maximand. —Wy W, arises from the borrowing constraint.
These results make it possible to focus on the linear-programming duality separately
from finding the optimal tlireshold of need in comparing the grandparents' contract and
the family's optimum problem:
PROPOSITION 9.2. The threshold value of 6 is identical for the credit problem of n
family and the grandparents' problem for a = r-1 .
PROOF: By proposition 9.1 and lennna E.3. the solution of the grandparents' problem
is dual to that of the family if the threshold value of need, 0*, is the same. Define 0* = 3Ab-
Then equation (S.H) for the value function of the family in a credit equilibrium is identical
to the equation for the grandparents' optimal threshold, (5.10).
PROPOSITION 9.3. The grandparents' contract with E(j) = y is equivalent to <i
credit equilibrium in which a = r~ L and the liquidity bound n* is defined by
0(1 -0)V
PROOF: Solve the zero-profit condition (7.2) to yield
(l-l3)V
__
l-f)F(t)*)
8{0*) '' l-F(9*)
The right hand side is identical to the right hand side of the credit equilibrium condition
(8.14). Recall the definition of p. that a = p~ l . and set r = p. Algebraic manipulation
then yields the result.
10. CURRENCY AND CREDIT ARE EQUIVALENT
I now show that the ticket system mentioned in section 2 is equivalent to the credit
system. Each family accumulates tickets, each of which is good for some fixed amount
of babysitting time: that value can change over time, yielding a return to ticket holders.
Babysitting can only be obtained up to current value of a family's ticket holdings, in other
words, they must obey a ticket (cash) in advance constraint.
To convert the dual of the inverse dual into a currency problem. I will use t lit 4 same
technique of redefining the choice variables as was done to generate the credit problem.
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The intuition is that the binding incentive constraint will be converted into the cash in
advance constraint. Also, the net of tax income will be defined once currency is defined.
The binding incentive compatibility constraint states that families in a low state of
need will not misrepresent themselves as desperate. Using the Euler equation for 0* (5.10).
the fact that Wy = S(B*)~ { . and solving the binding incentive constraint and the binding
recursion constraint for 7, and W{ yields
7i = 0. 72 = y + w+ (1 — a)W\ w\ — cx~ 1 (y 4- w + (1 — <y)W). w-i — 0.
The cash in advance constraint states that families cannot purchase babysitting in excess
of their available depreciated tickets: 7; < r~ l M, where r is the gross rate of return for real
balances. Substituting the solution for w\ into the binding incentive constraint, setting
r = a
-1
and defining M = a(y 4- w + (1 — a)W) yields the cash in advance constraint.
In a currency equilibrium, lump sum redistributions of seignorage or lump sum taxes
that finance deflation change the effective endowment from y to the net endowment y. In
the desperate state, families cannot use their current endowment for consumption because
of the cash in advance constraint. Therefore they put all the endowment into tickets. Using
the definition of tickets, net endowment is therefore
M!2 =a(y + {l-a)W) =y
where I have used the solution w-i = 0.
The family's problem can now be stated as
V = max{<£0i7i + (1 - 0)0272 + fl(V + Wy l {a~ ly) + Wy l {<f)M[ + (1 - 6)Mo)} (10.1)
subject to
07i + (1 ~ 4>h'-2 + {<t>M[ + (1 - 4>)M!2 ) < (*-
lM + y (10.2)
7, < a
_1M, 7t > 0.
As in the credit case, an additional restriction must be imposed for there to be an equi-
librium. The restriction connects the rate of return, r, and the net endowment, y. In my
1988 paper, I show this restriction to be
1 - rF(0*)
V ~ (l-F(9*))r !J
-
The gross rate of return is endogenously fixed in a credit equilibrium, but exogenously
determined by the government's inflation policy in a currency equilibrium. Since inflation
generates seignorage that is redistributed, net endowment becomes endogenous in the
currency equilibrium.
This reasoning and proposition 9.2 prove the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 10.1. Currency and credit are equivalent to a contract that satisfies
Eh) = y.
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11. ASSET EFFICIENCY
The remaining issue is the degree of efficiency attainable through asset equilibria and
the associated rate of return. The efficiency frontier delineated by the grandparents' zero-
profit contract has already been found: I simply note the rate of return associated with
it. Because of the equivalence of these contracts to asset equilibria, this efficiency bound
applies to asset equilibria as well. The efficiency bound requires borrowing constraints
to be nontrivially binding, and as I showed in my 1988 paper, generically prevents the
optimum quantity of money rule advocated by Friedman (1969) from being implemented.
PROPOSITION 11. 1. (i) If F is nonatomic, the upper bound f of the equilibrium
gross rate of return satisfies
r = F{d*)~\
with 7 strictly less than the inverse of the internal discount factor 1~ ] . and F( AAb) < 1.
(ii) The upper bound of welfare is attained at r. (Hi) Insurance in a credit or currency
equilibrium is incomplete.
PROOF: (i) This is a corollary7 of the equivalence of the credit equilibrium and con-
tract, and proposition 7.1. Using the equivalence of currency and credit in proposition
10.1, the same reasoning applies to currency equilibria.
The problem is that as the interest rate approaches the internal rate of discount, there
is too much attempted saving, not too little. But the resources to reward this saving do
not exist in the economy. In monetary equilibria, the attempt to violate the bound on the
rate of return encourages excessive holding of real balances, requiring lump sum taxes to
finance the associated deflation that exceed income. 1L1 I will next present the intuition
underlying this finding.
12. A FOLK THEOREM
A fundamental result in game theory is a "folk theorem" that states that in repeated
games, reputational equilibria can be supported for sufficiently large discount factors (Fu-
denberg and Maskin. 1986). A folk-theorem-like result applies to the present model: the
nonexistence of equilibria at high interest rates which is due to adverse selection can be
overcome by making the discount factor sufficiently high if the states are discrete. 12-1 As
I have modelled it here, the ^-shocks are distributed over a continuum. However, they can
just as easily be modelled over discrete states or a continuum with atoms. It turns out that
if the discreteness is coarse enough relative to the discount factor, then complete-insurance
equilibria can be sustained. Thus the folk theorem does not apply in its common form
This seems to parallel Bewley's (1983) result that there is an upper bound to the interest rate in
currency equilibria with stochastic endowments, which he expresses as individuals being; unable to afford
to pay their taxes.
19 1
Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) also found such a folk theorem result for a model of moral hazard in
which there is no discounting. Radner (1985) finds a folk theorem in games with discounting in which histo-
ries of actions are reviewed, much like the grandparents here implicitly review the histories of consumption
of the family.
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if there is a continuum of states. The analogue of the folk theorem here is rather that
the completeness of the insurance converges monotonically to complete insurance as the
discount factor converges to unity.
PROPOSITION 12.1. If F{-) has an atom at #, then there is a p such that for
J < J < 1 a credit equilibrium with complete insurance exists.
PROOF: The intuition of the proof is that it is possible to take a nonatomic distri-
bution and compress all the realizations of that exceed 0* into a single point; that point
is such that = 0*. First, set (3Ab = 0- Set the equilibrium interest rate r equal to
lim^^ F(#) _1 . Then choose ft = lim.e^F(0). Since the latter quantity is fixed by the
distribution F. some p can be found such that the upper bound of the interest rate is 1/p.
Expected welfare is therefore 0y/(l — [3). which results from complete insurance.
My 1988 paper presents an example of such an equilibrium. Obviously, the result can
be approximated by nonatomic distribution functions.
By loosening the borrowing constraint and making the maximal need state have
enough probability, then, complete insurance can be attained. The folk theorem does
not apply in the nonatomic case because for any discount factor less than one. it is pos-
sible to find a division of the continuum such that the need state has sufficiently small
probability that the conditions of proposition 12.1 are not satisfied.
The folk theorem result is connected to the adverse selection concept set out in the
classic paper of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). I will begin by recasting the Rothschild-
Stiglitz model in the stochastic linear utility mold I have been using here. The basic result
of Rothschild and Stiglitz is that if the population of high risk types is small enough, no
separating (nor pooling) equilibrium will exist. Here, a high risk type will be a family that
is currently desperate.
Each family lives two periods and has stochastic utility. The need states are perfectly
negatively correlated in that if an family is desperate now it is not desperate in the second
period and vice versa, but the current need state is private information. In this sense I am
following the modelling strategy of Green and Oh (1989). There are just two need states,
and 0. Each family has lifetime utility
0c + 00'
c'
All families are endowed with W units of time (but the endowment is not state-dependent
as it is in Rothschild and Stiglitz's model). The population has two types: fraction A is
desperate in the current period and nondesperate later, and vice versa for the second type
which comprises 1 — A of the population.
It is obviously efficient to separate these groups and give all endowment to the cur-
rently desperate families in return for their promise to give their endowment to the opposite
group in the second period. If a budget line with fair odds, that is of slope — A/(l — A), is
offered to all families, the currently desperate families will consume W/X and the currently
nondesperate families will consume nothing in the current period and \V/(l — A) in the
second period, as shown in the figure:
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W/(1-X)
desperate
w/>.
FIGURE 1
The slopes (marginal rates of substitution) of the indifference curves are — 0/ 80 in the
case of the currently desperate, and —&_/(3Q in the case of the currently nondesperate. As
long as they bracket the slope of the feasible budget (the fair odds line of Rothschild and
Stiglitz). there will be a separating equilibrium. But if the marginal rate of substitution
of the currently nondesperate grows too steep, they will declare themselves desperate and
there will be pooling and consequently no insurance. This can happen if the discount factor
shrinks too much, if the ratio of the minimum and maximum marginal utilities becomes
too extreme, or if the population of currently-desperate families becomes too small.
w/(i-;o
W/ K
FIGURE 2
Observe that the adverse selection intuition of Rothschild and Stiglitz transfers to this
setting. If the proportion of desperate families A is small, the "high risk" types have more
complete insurance. However if A becomes too small, the non-desperate families do not
wish to save because the physical endowment of the desperate families does not finance an
interest rate sufficient to make the other families be patient, and there is no equilibrium
with insurance.
To what extent does this intuition translate into the infinite horizon framework? With
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infinitely many periods, the combination of averaging and discounting make the equilibrium
essentially like that of the two-period case. With need realizations independent across time,
those with high current need are essentially like those families who are desperate in the
first period in the two-period setting, and vice versa for those with low current need.
In an infinite horizon setting however, there is a possibility of infinite runs of low need
or of desperation: (0,0, . . .); (0,0, . . .)• This would correspond to having an extra point
on a Rothschild- St iglitz diagram, one to the northeast of the endowment point. In this
setting that type would always claim desperation and a separating equilibrium would be
impossible. But the law of large numbers combined with discounting essentially rules out
such realizations, leaving just the two I analyzed. 122 With just those two cases, if
desperation is too rare, then A is too low, and the physical resources needed to finance the
return to patience won't exist in the infinite horizon setting either.
Having a continuum of realizations of need corresponds to adding types to the two-
period model, and pooling is then inevitable. When there is a continuum of types between
and 0. A is endogenous. Partitioning the population into those with < 0* and > H*
and making 0* large, with consumption in the initial period being given to the latter group,
will not work if the goal is to reveal who is most desperate.
The nonexistence of high-welfare credit or currency equilibria when there is a con-
tinuum of states is thus a kind of adverse selection, corresponding to having "too many"
states, resulting in some pooling of high risk or high need types. In a conventional utility
setting with stochastic income, wealth can take on infinitely many states, driving marginal
utility and utility as well into too many states, leaving high-marginal utility states with
a small fraction of the population, so that discounting induces violation of the incentive
constraints
—
pooling—for those close to those states. Counterexamples (such as my own
in my 1988 paper) depend on having discrete states and large discount factors so as to
effect separation. Institutions that restrict states so as to effect separation are thus likely
to be the only kind that achieve separation. As in all equilibria of this type, no institution
can be expected to overcome the "inefficiency" that accompanies the adverse selection
pressure—what Rothschild and Stiglitz call the information externality.
13. AN ANTI-FOLK THEOREM
The folk theorem of the previous section states that if families are very patient, complete
or almost complete insurance can be attained. However if families are less patient, the
upper bound of welfare is defined by the lower bound of a, the grandparents' discount
factor. As the grandparents become more patient, or equivalently as the asset rate of
return falls, welfare falls.
The grandparents" contract presumes full commitment by both the grandparents and
the family. Similarly, asset equilibria presume commitment by families to continuing par-
If however the family need shocks were serially correlated, such northeast points would become more
probable, and in the limit as serial correlation approached a martingale or random walk, could not be
ruled out. Intuitively, insurance would become impossible since no separation would be feasible. This is
exactly what emerges in my 1990 paper.
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ticipation. In a representative-agent model of asset equilibria, commitment is not an issue
because asset equilibria necessarily reflect all alternatives; interest rates are shadow values
of immutable allocations. In the babysitting cooperative, however, there are alternatives
to remaining in the contract. There is a minimum value state, and families may prefer to
revert to autarky rather than remain with the contract. I will call a contract immune from
defection if reverting to autarky is never preferred. This concept is useful because
equilibria should not be observable that are not immune from defection. It is a nontrivial
restriction on the set of contracts as I show below. It is simple to check whether a contract
is immune from defection: it must be the case that the minimum value state exceeds the
average value under autarky. Using the formula for the minimum value state (7.2),
a feasible contract is immune from defection if
l
-f>F{9m) em-!L- > E(B)-±-. (13.1)l-F(9*) K J l-P~ KJ 1-P
Define a such that the solution to (5.10) is F(0*) = a. This is the infimum of the
as that sustain feasible equilibria, and is associated with the supremum of family welfare.
The following proposition states that feasible equilibria such that welfare is close to the
supremum are not immune from defection.
PROPOSITION 13.1. There exists e > such that for all a G (o. a+e), the associated
feasible contracts are not immune from defection.
PROOF: Since in the grandparents' contract /; = a-1 , and lim^-^ F{ti*) = p
-1
,
which violates the immunity condition (13.1).
Feasible contracts that are immune from defection exist and are associated with patient
grandparents but low asset rates of return and low average welfare.
PROPOSITION 13.2. There exists a such that the associated feasible contracts are
immune from defection.
PROOF: Since (3 < 1, lim«_i £($*) > E(9). Using the Euler condition (6.10) and the
fact that p = a
-1
,
which satisfies the immunity condition (13.1).
The results are in agreement with those of Haller (1989) who examines a two-jxTson
repeated game with an insurance aspect; the results are also in agreement with the more
This is a more primitive concept than renegotiation proofness. Families that reverted to autarky
could later apply for readmittance; I assume that a grim strategy is used on those families
13.2 , ,
1 analyze on
the current period
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I ly the case in which reversion to autarky takes place after the contract is executed in
general finding that dynamically consistent asset equilibria seem to require low or negative
rates of return, such as in Atkeson (1987), Manuelli (1985), and Kehoe and Levine (1990).
The high value of c* translates into low (or even negative) interest rates being necessary
for asset equilibria being immune from defection. While high inflation and strict credit
restrictions have a mundane explanation in countries with weak or rapacious governments,
they are harder to explain in democratic societies when the efficiency of low inflation and
unrestricted markets is so widely understood. The theory presented here predicts that
inflation and credit restrictions might be necessary to sustain immunity from defection.
14. CONCLUSION
The grandparents' discount factor is exogenous, and the minimum value state permitted
is also exogenous. When zero profit is in addition imposed, only one of these parameters
can be exogenous, the other becoming endogenous. This same pattern is repeated in the
asset equilibria: in the credit equilibrium, the borrowing constraint is exogenous, and the
rate of return endogenous: in the currency equilibrium, the rate of return is exogenous,
and the net of tax endowment endogenous.
The equilibria can be characterized by discount factors. With grandparents who dis-
count the future heavily, efficiency can be approached within the confines of the incentive
constraints. When the cooperative attempts to duplicate a grandparents' contract, the
contract must be resource feasible, and due to the concommitant adverse selection the
maximum sustainable rate of return falls, along with efficiency. When immunity from de-
fection is also required, the maximum sustainable interest rate is even lower, as is efficiency.
Only the latter equilibria should be empirically observable; they explain why inefficient
inflation rates and credit restrictions seem to be the rule.
While the technical framework here is narrow, the findings are striking in light of
the fact that assets have a prominent role in economic growth and business cycles. My
results suggest that cash in advance models are the correct way to model currency, but that
heterogeneous-agent models are needed for this motivation to have analytical meaning. It
may therefore be possible to advance our understanding of growth and business cycles with
an extension of the contract approach.
August 31, 1992
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APPENDIX
A. MONOTONICITY INDUCED BY THE CONSTRAINTS
In this appendix I show that the grandparents' policy functions have a monotonicity
property which in turn greatly simplifies the sets over which family value states stochasti-
cally evolve. The strategy of this section will be to show that there are two types of sets
of values of 9, A and D. Within each set there is a fixed strategy, and across the sets the
incentive constraints hold in a particular way. Then I show that the sets necessarily have
a monotonic relationship with each other. Finally, I show that no other sets of admissible
9 exist.
Proposition A.l. For 9 > s, (i) 7(6, V) > j(s, V), and (ii) V'(9. V) < V'(s. V).
PROOF: (i) The incentive constraints corresponding to 9 and s are
9-/(9. V) + dV(9. V) > 87(3. V) + 3V'{8, V). (A.l)
57(5, V) + pV(s, V) > sj{9, V) + pV(9, V) (A.2)
Adding the two conditions yields
(0_ S)(7(0)_ 7 (5))>O. (A.:])
Since $ > s, (~
;
(9) -7(5)) > 0.
(ii) Using the result from (i), (A.2) can be written
(3V(s, V) - (3V(0, V) > 3(7(6, V) - 7(.s. V)) > (.4.4 - 5)
which proves the result.
PROPOSITION A.2. For the set A such that for 9 e A. 7(0, V) - 0, then V'(9. V) is
constant.
PROOF: Substituting 7(0, V) into (A. 1-2) and supposing that both 9 e A and s € .4.
the incentive constraints (A.l) and (A.2) are symmetric, and therefore V'{9. V) = V'{s. V)
necessarily holds.
PROPOSITION A. 3. If there exists a set B ofpositive F-measure such that for 9 e B,
V'(9. V) = V, then y($, V) is constant with respect to 9.
PROOF: Substitute V_ into (A. 1-2). Then in order for both inequalities to be satisfied,
symmetry requires that both constraints hold with equality, and the result follows.
Proposition A.4. If s e A so that 7(5, V) = and 9 e B so that V'(9. V) = V,
then s <9.
PROOF: All incentive constraints must hold with equality within the sets .4 and B
due to symmetry. The remaining incentive constraints take the form
9~/{9. V) + 0V > PV'(s, V). (-4.7)
PV'(s,V) > 87(0, V) + PV (As)
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The right hand side of (A. 7) is identical to the left hand side of (A.8), and so the combined
inequality can be stated
07(0, V) + 0V > S7(0, V) + pV
which requires > s.
PROPOSITION A.5. If7 > for some set of positive F-measure, then the recursion
constraint is binding.
PROOF: Suppose the contrary for the optimal functions 7 and V . Then choose a
constant e such that 7(0, 0) > e. for all on some set A. Because t is constant, the incentive
constraints will not be violated within this set since 0e is subtracted from both sides of
each incentive constraint. Outside the set, 7 < e. The incentive constraints across the two
sets must mesh. Suppose G A and s G" A. The pair of constraints is
9-f(0) + pV'(9) >8~(s) + W(s)
s1(s)+/3V,(s)>s1(9)^^V, (e).
Since by assumption 7(5) < e. then y(s) < j(8) as well. By proposition A.l. > s.
Cascading the inequalities leaves
7 (0) > S7(0)
and therefore
0(7(0) - €) > S (7(0) - e).
Substituting 0(7(0) — e) into the recursion constraint (4.2) leaves the recursion constraint
satisfied. The maximum of the problem (1.1) is therefore raised by
ef dF
J A
which contradicts the optimality of 7.
PROPOSITION A. 6. There is a single 0* dividing the sets A and B, so A U B = [0. 0]
.
PROOF: Suppose the contrary, so that there is a set X such that both yx >
and Vx > V_. The upper bound of the set A is s*, and the lower bound of set B is t*
so that by monotonicity, s* < t* . Again by monotonicity, < 7(2;, V) < 7(^,V
r
) and
V< V'(x]v) < V'(s,V).
The incentive constraints must hold at s* , the lower bound ofX and the upper bound
of A:
(3V>s*>yx + pVx >(3V
and therefore all hold with equality. Also,
(3V > 5*7 + 0V.
The incentive constraints must also hold at t* . the upper bound ofX and the lower bound
of A:
t*l + PV>t*jx + /3Vx > QV.
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Since t* > s* . both inequalities are strict.
It is therefore possible to raise and lower -?(x) and V'(x) by small amounts without
violating the incentive constraints. For a localized change at s* (where the incentive
constraints are binding) which reduces 7(3* + e) and increases V'(s* + e), s* + e 6 X, this
requires
dV s*
which does not alter the recursion constraint. The return to the grandparents is reduced
by dF(s*)d/y. while the functional EfV^i/')] is increased due to the change in V. It is
optimal to undertake the decrease in 7 if the the objective decreases with respect to the
changes of 7 and V . otherwise it is optimal to increase 7X and reduce Vx in like manner.
The limits on this change are the nonnegativity and minimum value constraints (4.4-5).
Thus there is a cutoff value of 9. 9* . such that below that point a single policy is
followed by the grandparents and vice versa:
' It, 9*<9<9 [ '
V'(H) = {
V
-
^<"<"1 (A10)
The incentive constraints have the form
[JV > ^7 + (3V B<ti<9*.
8y + (3V>0V 0* < <0.
Both constraints will be satisfied if and only if the hunger threshold B* satisfies the equation
0*7 + PV = (3V. (.4.11)
The grandparents' problem is now reduced to finding the characteristics of solutions with
the pairs of threshold values 7 and V and finding the optimal hunger threshold. Q* . It
should be emphasized that 0* need not be in [0. 9} . If it is not, the equilibrium is degenerate.
The condition necessary and sufficient for 0* G [#, 9} is presented in section (i.
B. SOLUTION OF THE GRANDPA RENTS' PROBLEM
With the finding that policies necessarily have the threshold form, the grandparents'
maximum problem can be restated in these terms:
maxj/y - (1 - F(d*))y + aF(0*)W(V) + <*(1 - F{9*))W(V)} (BA)
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subject to
V=
J
&7dF{0) + 0F(6*)V + 0(l-F(9*))V (B.2)
Je*
and the binding incentive constraint
-9*7 + 0(7 -V) =0. (B.3)
*Q
For notational convenience, I now define the quantities $(9*) = J , 9dF{9) and £{9*) =
F(9*)9* + <&(9*). (The notation 5 is purposely meant to evoke statistical expectation: if
F is Bernoulli, and 9* is between the two realizations, then £ = E{9).) In matrix form the
two constraints then take the form
<f>{9*) 3F{9*)\ (V-0{1-F{O*))V
-9* ) { 0V
(DA)
with solution
[V-0V). (S.6)
£{9*)
Because they are affine in the family's current value state, V . these solutions will be used
to characterize the growth conditions that limit equilibria.
The problem of finding the optimal threshold value of 9* can be considered separately
from that of finding the optimal functions 7 and V . In this endeavor, posit that W is affine
in the current value state: W(F) = W + WyV . I will show that this function solves the
dynamic programming recursion; in appendix C I show that it is the grandparents' value
function. Using the intuition that W is decreasing in V. the solutions of the maximum
problem can be stated easily: consumption will be zero if the family signals nondesperation,
and will be at a maximum if desperation is signalled. Thus in the case of desperation, the
family's value state will revert to its minimum. In the case of nondesperation. the family's
value state grows according to (B.5).
Substituting the optimal values into the value function recursion yields solutions for
the coefficients Wo and Wy. Equating coefficients of powers of V, the solutions are
w l ( j.(a ^ 3(1- F(8')) \
WV = - f\-^K . (B.8)
Observe that the marginal value of the state, Wy, depends only on the stochastic structure
of the taste shocks, not on the current state.
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The optimal need threshold. Invoking the envelope condition, I use the linear
programming solutions that hold F(0*) fixed and focus on the problem of choosing 0*
.
The first order condition for this problem is
7F'(0*) + aF'($*)(W{V) - W(V)) = 0.
Dividing out F'{B*) yields
j = aW'(V)(V-V) (R9)
using the fact that W is affine. Substituting the solution for W'(V) and for V_ and V yields
the Euler equation in 6*
.
H* = -£{B*). (RIO)
a
Proposition B.l. UF is nonatomic and a > 3, then there is a unique ti* e [#,#].
PROOF: The following properties are easily verified for £(9)\ (i) £(0) = E{6)\ (li)
E{9) = 0; (in) £'((9) = F(0). These conditions, combined with a > 0, imply 0/a£(O) > 0.
(3/a£(9) < 0, and j3/a£'{H) < ft/a < 1. Therefore there is a unique interior crossing point.
Corollary B.2. Wv =
-^l^*)
-1
.
Proof: Substitute (B.10) into (B.8).
C. THE AFFINE FUNCTION IS THE GRANDPARENTS' VALUE FUNCTIONAL
The fixed point of the grandparents' dynamic programming recursion is affine. and is
therefore also unbounded and is potentially not the value function. The return "function"
on the right hand side of the grandparents' recursion is an expected value—a functional;
this reflects the grandparent
s
1
lack of knowledge of the current realization of the taste
shock. 0. The grandparents choose functions, not values of the feasible control.
Because the return functional requires the choice of a function, the exercise is like-
deterministic dynamic programming in spirit, and the methods developed for deterministic
dynamic programming can be applied. In particular, I must show that all feasible plans
sequences of feasible functions—lead to convergent discounted returns, as in Assumption
2 of Stokey and Lucas's discussion of deterministic dynamic programming (Stokey and
Lucas, p. 68). The analogue of their Theorem 4.3 can then be developed.
I will first show that the constraints are such that the feasible policies and states
grow within a bound, and therefore that if the discount factor of the grandparents is low
enough—that is if the grandparents are impatient enough—the solution of the dynamic
progrannning problem is the value function. There are two steps. In the first step I show
that feasible policies that do not have a single threshold 0* are dominated in the growth
condition sense by those that do. The second step is to show that policies with a single
threshold have an upper bound to their growth rate.
The growth condition relates the new value state of the family, V . to the old value
state, V. I want to show that the value does not grow too fast. The first step is to
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show that in the simplest case, that of a single threshold, the maximum growth factor is
associated with the maximum threshold.
LEMMA C.l. If there is a single threshold B* . the maximum value ofV is attained
ifO* =6.
PROOF: If there is a single threshold (9*. the solution for V is given in equation (6.6)
in the main text. The derivative of that solution with respect to 0* is
$(0*)
S(0*) 2
which is positive.
It may be the case that a higher growth factor is feasible if instead of a single threshold.
0*
. there are two. If so, there are then three sets. -4. B. and X as in proposition A. 7. Let
s G .4. x G A', and t G D. with s < x < t. The lower bound ofX is s*, and the upper bound
of AT is t* . By monotonicity, the maximal V is an element of A, and therefore without loss
of generality. 7,4 = 0. Call this maximal policy V.4. Similarly, by monotonicity. Vb = V.
Also suppose that within AT, jx and Vx are constant. The recursion constraint is
V =
J
(3VAdF{6)+ I {07x + 0Vx }dF(6) + f {6jB +P¥}dF(6).
Now consider only the two adjacent sets A and X. Define a new probability distribution
F on the union of those two sets. The recursion constraint can be rewritten
Fit*)' 1 iv- j {hB + PX5dF(0)\ =F(t*)~' If(s*)/3Va + J {Olx + PVx}dF(B)y
LEMMA C.2. The maximum value o{Va is attained if s* = t*.
PROOF: Holding Vx fixed, the incentive constraints relating .4 and X and the newly
defined recursion constraint can be solved for Va and jx as in equation (5.7). By lemma
C.l applied with the conditional distribution F, Va is maximized by letting s* approach
t* From (5.9), increasing s* also decreases jx, which maintains monotonicity.
If this solution violates an incentive constraint, then approach it by increasing Va and
decreasing yx until the constraints are binding.
Any policy function must be measurable, and any measurable function is approximable
by a simple function. The reasoning of the above proof can be recursively aplied to adjacent
portions of the domain of the simple function. Therefore the maximum Va must be attained
with a single threshold. The next proposition characterizes the maximum growth factor
associated with a single threshold.
Lemma C.3. The maximum growth factor ofV is /3-1 .
PROOF: From the above lemmata and the solution for the growth rate p of V found
in equation (6.2), lim^^ 0/d£{9) = 3~ l . m
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LEMMA C.4. If a < (3 l , then for every feasible policy, the affine function \V that
solves the grandparents' dynamic programming recursion satisfies lirnr-^oo o/T Je W(VT ) =
0.
PROOF: By lemma C.3. the maximum growth factor of V is 0~ l ] substituting into
the affine solution of the dynamic programming problem.
a
e
TWiV 1 (9))dF{9) < aT snp\W(VT {9))\
o
< <*
T {Wo + Wv ((1 - 3-T)Vs + 3~TV)}
the limit of which is zero by the assumption that or/3- < 1.
PROPOSITION C.5. The affine functional W found to satisfy the dynamic program-
ming recursion is the value functional.
Since it is easy to find that an affine function satisfies the dynamic programming
recursion, this proposition says that the affine function is in fact the value functional.
PROOF: The proof exactly parallels the proof of Theorem 4.3 of Stokey and Lucas
(p. 72). There are two main steps. The first is to show that the affine solution weakly
dominates all feasible solutions of the optimization problem. The second is to show that
the affine solution is weakly dominated by the supremum of the solutions.
The first step then begins
W[V°]> / {y-~f l (0))dF(0) + aW[V l ]
Je
where V 1 and 7 1 are feasible functions conditional on the initial function V°:
/ {y-~f
l {0))dF{6) + OL2 I {y-i2 {e))dF{0) + --- + aTW[VT ]
Je Je
-e
>
Taking the limit on the right hand side, the last term tends to zero. Since the feasible
sequences of functions include the optimal one. the affine solution weakly dominates the
optimal sequence.
The second step states that for e. arbitrarily small, define a sequence {cn \ such that
X^Lj a n ~ l Sn < e/2. Because W is found by taking the supremum in the dynamic pro-
gramming equation, it is possible to find a function V 1—namely the argsup—so that the
supremum is dominated as follows.
f
e
W[V°] < / (y - i
L (0))dF(9) + ct\V{V 1 } + c }
Je
Similarly.
WIV1 ] < / (// - ~i
2 {0))dF{H) + aW[V2 ] + 62
Je
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and so on. Iterating these inequalities leaves
W[V°] < / (y - ~i
l {e))dF{6) + +a (y - 7
2 (0))<£F(0) + • + aTW[VT ] + e/2.
For sufficiently large T, o:TW[VT ] < e/2. Therefore the atfine solution is dominated by
some feasible sequence.
D. THE AFFINE FIXED POINT OF THE MAPPING IS THE VALUE FUNCTION FOR INDIVIDUALS
This appendix is devoted to showing that when a growth condition is satisfied for
families, that it is legitimate to treat the fixed point that is the solution to the dynamic
programming problem in the space of affine functions as the unique value function, just
as intuition suggests. The exercise is a mechanical one: I simply show that assumptions
9.1 and 9.2 of Stokey and Lucas (1989) are satisfied for appropriate ranges of the interest
rate, borrowing limit, and discount factor and apply their Theorem 9.2.
I also show in this section that when these parameter bounds are violated, the value
is infinite, and the associated optimal policy calls for behavior that is infeasible in the
aggregate, again as intuition suggests.
I will now draw the notational correspondence with Stokey and Lucas (1989. p. 241).
First, the stochastic state space is Z = {0 G [0, #]}. The endogenous state is x = B. with
B e [B_. oo] with the Borel measure applied to the latter. Thus the state space is the
measurable product space (5,5) = ([#, 0] x [B, oo), T x B).
The set of feasible choices is given by the budget constraint, the liquidity constraint
and the noimegativity constraint on consumption:
T{0,B) = {B' :B' e [B.y+(l + r)B]},
so T : [0,9] x [J?, oo) — [B,dc), and B' € T(Q.B).
The graph of T is
A= {(B.O.B') e \B,-x) x \B,oo) x [0,0] : B' eT(B.tt)}
The return function is:
F(B. B'. 0) = 0(y + (1 + r)B - B').
I now show that Assumption 9.1 of Stokey and Lucas is satisfied.
LEMMA D.l . (i) T is nonempty- (u) The graph ofT is B x B x T-measurable. (Hi)
T has a measurable selection: that is, there is a measurable function h : S —> X such that
H(s) eT(s), allse S.
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PROOF: (i) Since B is always feasible. T is nonempty, (ii) Since T is not dependent
on the taste shocks, the graph of T can be written more simply as
A= {{B.B') e [Roc) x [B.oc) : B' eT{B)}.
Thus the graph is the closed, and so is in the product measure, (iii) Clearly T is a closed
correspondence since it takes values that are closed intervals. Also its domain. [6. 6} x[B_,yz)
is a subset of R2 . This satisfies the conditions of Theorem 7.6 of Stokey and Lucas (p.
184).
Next I show that Assumption 9.2 of Stokey and Lucas is satisfied.
ASSUMPTION D.2 . There is some n* > -oo such that
LS_ > 1).
r
Define the sigma algebra of the graph, A, as the extension of the product of the sets
T x B x B (see Taylor, p. 135), and take the product measure.
LEMMA D.3 . (i) F : A -* R is A-measurable and (ii) F > 0.
PROOF: (i) One need only note that the components of F are measurable. That is. H
is a T-measurable function on [$_, #], and (// + (1 + r)B — B') is the sum of monotone (and
hence ^-measurable) functions on B. The measure of the product (J(y + (14- r)B — B')
is the product of the measures, (ii) Trivial by the definition of F and the restriction of
Assumption D.2.
Now I make an assumption that amounts to a growth condition. The discounting of
returns must be strong enough to assure convergence of the discounted returns even if the
most extreme realizations occur. The most extreme realizations are of maximum hunger,
and the maximum return occurs if all resources are put into consumption at those extreme
realizations; if zero consumption occurs in anticipation of such extreme realizations, the
accumulated assets can be cashed in when maximum hunger is attained. Thus:
Assumption D.4 . 0(1 + r) < 1.
With this assumption discounted utility is bounded:
Jim 6 t
{l + T ' )til ~ l
6y = [(0(1 + r)Y -^t-~oc r r
PROPOSITION D.5 . The function V that satisfies the dynamic programming recur-
sion is the value function.
PROOF: Since V. the function that satisfies the dynamic programming recursion,
is afrlne in the state. B. it suffices to show that the argument of V satisfies the growth
condition in Assumption D.4. This means the hypothesis given in equation (7) of Theorem
9.2 of Stokey and Lucas is satisfied. Also lemmata D.l and D.3 show that the conditions
of the theorem are satisfied.
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PROPOSITION D.6 . If the growth condition is violated, no value or policy function
exists.
PROOF: (i) If the growth condition is not satisfied, an individual could follow a
strategy of waiting to consume until his hunger were extremely high. Suppose this is
the policy function. The discounted value of such a strategy is then infinite. However
such an individual would never consume; even if faced with a very liigh hunger state that
exceeded his minimum hunger threshold, he could gain even more in discounted terms by
delaying consumption, (ii) Suppose the opposite strategy: delaying consumption forever.
This cannot be optimal because it yields zero discounted utility. Consuming at any time
attains positive discounted utility and therefore dominates the strategy. The optimal policy
function and value function therefore do not exist.
The point of this result is that an equilibrium cannot be sustained if the interest rate
is too high: the technical nature of the breakdown is that any conjectured equilibrium
that had a high interest rate would not satisfy individual optimization, since no optimum
exists.
E. CREDIT EQUILIBRIA
PROOF: [Of Proposition 8.2]: From (8.8) it is apparent that Ab is an increasing function
of the interest rate, r, so dF/dr > 0. Since F is an increasing function of As- differentiating
the right hand side of (8.14) yields
F
|
(r-l)(dF/dr) \ •
1-F (l-F) 2
which is negative. Therefore, for a given n* < 0, both the left and right hand sides of
(8.14) are decreasing in r. and are equal for r = 1. The derivative of the left hand side of
(8.14) with respect to r at r = 1 is 1 + n*, which is negative for n* < — 1. The derivative
of the right hand side of (8.14) with respect to r at r = 1 is —F(/3A)/(1 — F(pA)). which
is also negative. As r approaches l/fl. F(flA) —* 1, so the right hand side of (8.14)
approaches — oo, but the left hand side remains positive. The derivative of the left hand
side at r = 1 can be made arbitrarily negative by decreasing n*, leaving the derivative of
the right hand side unaffected. Therefore there must be some interior crossing point such
that 1 < r < 1/(3 in addition to the intersection at r = 1. However at r = 1 (8.13) is
undefined.
The following lemma shows that when utility is linear there is no difference between a
standard stochastic dynamic programming problem in which policies are chosen in response
to current realized states, with policy functions then defined by the policies over all possible
realizations (as in the family's credit decisions), and one in which the current return
function is an average of returns over all states and policy functions are chosen before
the realization of the state (as in the grandparents' contract problem).
LEMMA E.3. Let V(-,0) be weakly increasing in its first argument. Define
(*) V* = max / {Oc(6) + JV{B'(0).6))dF{9)
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subject to the constraints
,-e
I (c(6) + B'{9))dF{9) <y + rB,
Je
c> 0.
B' > £,
and
(**) V** (6) = max I 6c +
J
3V{B' .6)dF{0)\
subject to
c + B' < y + rB.
c > o.
B'">B
V*
-fJe V**(O)dF(0)
Then
PROOF: (>) Averaging the budget constraint in problem (*) means that all policies
feasible under the budget constraints in (**) are also feasible under (*). Therefore the
optimal policy function defined by (**) is feasible for (*). Since V* is an optimum.
fe fe
V* > / (Oc**(O) + [W(B'**(0),e))dF(O)= V**(0)dF{B).
Je_ Je_
(<) (i) The budget constraint in (*) is binding. If the budget constraint is not binding,
increase c for some set of positive measure. This does not affect the other constraints and
increases the objective, (ii) The policy function c in (*) is monotone increasing in H. For
suppose it is not, so that c{s) — ci > c(0) = c-i-, for some s < 6, and this inequality holds in
neighborhoods of positive and equal F-measure around .s and 6. Then simply interchange
c(s) and c{0)\ this does not affect the budget constraint, but increases the objective, since
SC2 + OC1 > sc\ +$c-2. (iii) It is suboptimal for neither of the constraints c > and B' > H
to hold for the same 0. By increasing c and decreasing B' or vice versa, the objective can
be increased.
These three steps show that if is suboptimal to violate the budget constraint for (**)
for particular values of while satisfying it on average (*). Averaging of the budget sets
of (**) therefore does not enlarge the set of feasible policies except on sets of F-measure
zero. Form a sequence of feasible policies for problem (*), including the optimal policy.
V* is the supremum of averages of these policies, while E{V**) is the average of suprema.
Therefore by Fatou's Lemma (Taylor, 1973, p. 121),
V* < I V**(0)dF{0).
Jo
completing the argument.
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F. CONVERGENCE OF *
If the initial distribution of credit or real balances did not match the stationary distri-
bution ^. would an arbitrary distribution converge to it? This question is potentially very
difficult because if the initial distribution were not equal to the stationary distribution, the
interest rate might potentially be different from the stationary interest rate, and noncon-
stant as the distribution $ evolved. Because the threshold 0* is independent of wealth, the
question of the stationarity of the interest rate can be decoupled from that of the station-
arity of V . I approach the question by noting that if convergence can be demonstrated for
the corresponding value states in the grandparents' contract, then convergence will occur
for the corresponding distribution of real balances or credit with a constant rate of return.
LEMMA F.l. The stochastic process of value states satisfies Condition M [Stokey
and Lucas. 1989, p. 348].
PROOF: The result follows from the fact that families inevitably transit to the
minimum value state. V_, because they eventually become desperate. More formally.
consider a set A that is a subset of the reals in excess of the minimum value state:
A C S = {x : x > V}, where S is the set of all admissible value states. There are
two cases, (i) If V_ e A, then for s G S, P(s, A) (the one-period transition probability from
s to A) is 1 - F(9*). (ii) UV&A, then P(s. Ac ) > 1 - F(6*) since V C Ac . Thus it is
necessary only to set e. = 1 — F(f)*). m
THEOREM F.2. (i) If the interest rate is a constant, any initial distribution function
of credit, $k, converges strongly to the unique stationary \&. (ii) The rate of return is
unaffected by the initial distribution of states.
PROOF: (i) This follows from identifying each credit level with a value state as in
section 10 of the main text. Then apply lemma F.l and Theorem 11.12 of Stokey and
Lucas (1989). (ii) Since r — a-1
,
a constant, and convergence holds for fixed o, the result
follows.
I direct the reader's attention to appendix G which explicitly treats a special case.
G. NONSTATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
It is instructive to examine the case that divides the stationary credit equilibria from
the cases where an equilibrium does not exist. The dividing line case has the interesting
property that it is ex-ante efficient, but the equilibrium distribution function of credit. #.
does not converge strongly. It suggests that optimality and stationarity may be incom-
patible in an equilibrium, and suggests that efficiency be studied as the limiting case of
stationary but inefficient equilibria.
If the usual borrowing constraint. B > —y/(r — 1), were used (r is the gross interest
rate), borrowers would remain permanently in debt, paying all endowment in interest. The
class of borrowers would grow to include the entire population, and the class of creditors
would continually shrink toward zero, with the wealth of each creditor tending to infinity.
This nonstationary behavior does not seem very realistic. The equilibrium interest rate in
this case is the same as the limiting gross interest rate of 1/ F{3A). Suppose the economy
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begins with zero credit for all families. The fraction F{3A) will be nondesperate and will
save, and a fraction (1 — F({3A)) will be desperate, borrowing y/(r — 1). There must be
no aggregate debt in equilibrium, so the condition
(l-F(/?I))(-^
I )
+ F(/?3)y =
must hold. In the next period the initial debtors remain debtors, but their ranks are
swelled by the fraction (1 — F(pA)) of creditors who become desperate. Nondesperate
creditors see the value of their savings grow by the interest rate, and in addition invest
their endowment anew. Thus in the second period the condition
((1 - F(pA)) + (1 - F(flA))F(PA)) (-j^-j) + (F(0A)) 2 (y + ry) = '
must hold. Continuing this reasoning, after T periods.
(1 _ F)izi^ (_^ )=(^izi:
1 — F r — 1 1 — r
must hold, and it is algebraically straightforward to demonstrate that r = 1/ F(3A) solves
this equation for all finite T
.
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